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IN DEFENSE OF THE SELF-REFERENCING QUANTIFIER S𝑥.
APPROXIMATION OF SELF-REFERENTIAL SENTENCES
BY DYNAMIC SYSTEMS
Abstract. Arguments in defense of introducing the self-referencing quantifier Sx and its approxi-
mation on dynamical systems are consistently presented. The case of classical logic is described
in detail. Generated 3-truth tables that match Priest’s tables (Priest 1979). In the process of
constructing 4-truth tables, two more truth values were revealed that did not coincide with the
original ones. Therefore, the closed tables turned out to be 6-digit.
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We are talking about the S icon, which first appeared in the article (Johnstone 1981):
𝑄 =𝑑𝑓 S𝑄𝑃 .
According to the meaning, S indicates that the entire expression belongs to self-
referencing, and introduces the entire self-referential construction to the rank of WFF.
The Liar sentence looks like this in this language: S𝑄∼T𝑄. This is a well-formed
formula. And this is important.
Self-referential sentences deserve to be marked out in language for their self-refer-
encing. To do this, we fix the self-referencing of the sentence using a special icon—the
self-referencing icon S𝑥, which is placed in front of the predicate 𝑃(𝑥), which we call
the core of the self-referential sentence. As a result, a self-referential sentence looks
like this:
S𝑥𝑃(𝑥) (1)
In place of the variable 𝑥 in 𝑃(𝑥) from (1), nothing can be substituted except for
this sentence itself. You cannot substitute anything in the newly received sentence in x,
except for this sentence itself, etc. Those. a self-referential sentence is outwardly closed,
and the expression S𝑥, according to this criterion, can well be attributed to quantifiers,
because it is the presence of S𝑥 that makes expression (1) closed. Expression (1) obeys
the axiom of self-reference, which is the essence of the axiom of a fixed point (Feferman
1984):
S𝑥𝑃(𝑥) = 𝑃(S𝑥𝑃(𝑥)) (2)
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Peirce intuitively applied (2) to generate an infinite Liar sentence:
S𝑥𝑃(𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑃(𝑃(𝑃(… S𝑥𝑃(𝑥) …)))) (3)
This infinite sentence consists of an infinite number of nested Liar kernels. Let’s
break it down into iterative steps, discarding the “last” expression … S𝑥𝑃(𝑥) …:
S𝑥𝑃(𝑥) ≈ ⟨𝑥, 𝑃 (𝑥), 𝑃 (𝑃 (𝑥)), 𝑃 (𝑃 (𝑃(𝑥))), …⟩ (4)
The ≈ indicates an approximation. Expression (4) on the right will be considered as
an approximation of a real self-referential sentence S𝑥𝑃(𝑥). To denote the result of
the approximation, we will choose the sign S to distinguish it from S—a real quantifier
of self-reference. The expression S𝑥 will also be called a self-referencing quantifier, if
this does not lead to an error.
In front of the sequence of kernels in (4), we insert the variable 𝑥 = 𝑃 0(𝑥) to
distinguish one specific branch of the approximation from another.
To begin with, we write down the definitions of the usual quantifiers ∀𝑥 (5), ∃𝑥
(6), and add to them the definition of an approximation of our new self-referencing
quantifier S𝑥 from (4):
∀𝑥𝑃(𝑥) ⇌ 𝑃 (𝑥1) ∧ 𝑃(𝑥2) ∧ 𝑃(𝑥3) ∧ … where 𝑥 ∈ {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, …} (5)
∃𝑥𝑃 (𝑥) ⇌ 𝑃(𝑥1) ∨ 𝑃(𝑥2) ∨ 𝑃(𝑥3) ∨ … where 𝑥 ∈ {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, …} (6)
S𝑥𝑃 (𝑥) ⇌ ⟨𝑥, 𝑃 (𝑥), 𝑃 (𝑃 (𝑥)), 𝑃 (𝑃 (𝑃(𝑥))), …⟩ where 𝑥 ∈ {0, 1} in our case (7)
Definition (7) resembles Peirce’s expressions at the beginning of this section. On
the other hand, expression (7) is the definition of the trajectory of a dynamical system
of the form ({0, 1}, 𝑃 (𝑥)) with orbits ⟨𝑃 𝑛(𝑥), 𝑛 ∈ Z+⟩, where 𝑃 𝑛(𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑃 𝑛−1(𝑥)).
This justifies the title of our article. Expression (7) in the theory of dynamical systems
(Sharkovsky 1989) is called the trajectory or orbit of the dynamical system. We use
the characteristics of such a movement here.
Consider the case when the kernels of self-referential sentences 𝑃(𝑥) are composed
of 𝑇 𝑟(𝑥) using propositional connectives ↔ and ¬:
𝑃 (𝑥) ∈ {𝑇 𝑟(𝑥), ¬𝑇 𝑟(𝑥), 𝑇 𝑟(𝑥) ↔ 𝑇 𝑟(𝑥), 𝑇 𝑟(𝑥) ↔ ¬𝑇 𝑟(𝑥)}. (8)
The rest of the formulas we are considering are equivalent to these four. The
variable 𝑥 and the predicates P(x) from (8) in our case take values from {0, 1}. It is
easy to see that expression (7) is periodic, with a maximum period of 2. This means
that the second and third terms of the sequence (7) determine the entire remaining
infinite sequence. Therefore, in our case, we rightfully shorten the definition of a self-
referencing quantifier as follows:
S𝑥𝑃(𝑥) ⇌ ⟨𝑥, 𝑃 (𝑥), 𝑃 (𝑃 (𝑥))⟩. (9)
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Since there are only two values of 𝑥 in sequence (9) in our case: 𝑥 ∈ {0, 1}, then
statement (9) itself splits into two sequences. And since we have no reason to give
preference to any one of them, we will combine them as equal elements of the set in
(10):
S𝑥𝑃(𝑥) = {⟨1, 𝑃 (1), 𝑃 (𝑃 (1))⟩, ⟨0, 𝑃 (0), 𝑃 (𝑃 (0))⟩}. (10)
In the case when the values of 𝑥 will be more (or less) than two, the number of members
of the sets in (9) and (10) should be changed accordingly. This is one of the properties
of the definition of the approximation of the self-referencing quantifier S𝑥, which allows
it to be used in other logical systems, and not only in classical ones, as in the case under
consideration.
Now let us define the action of the external negation sign ¬. To do this, we will
divide our manipulations into several cases. The first of them is when the kernel 𝑃(𝑥)
of a self-referential sentence is the identically true [𝑃 (𝑥) = 𝑇 𝑟(𝑥) ↔ 𝑇 𝑟(𝑥)), i.e. 𝑃(0) =
𝑃(1) = 1] or the identically false [𝑃 (𝑥) = 𝑇 𝑟(𝑥) ↔ ¬𝑇 𝑟(𝑥)), i.e. 𝑃(0) = 𝑃(1) = 0]
formula. Then, for example, for 𝑃(𝑥) ≡ 1 we get
¬S𝑥𝑃(𝑥) = ¬{⟨1, 1, 1⟩, ⟨0, 1, 1⟩} (= ¬T) (11)
= {¬⟨1, 1, 1⟩, ¬⟨0, 1, 1⟩} (12)
= {⟨¬1, ¬1, ¬1⟩, ⟨¬0, ¬1, ¬1⟩} (13)
= {⟨0, 0, 0⟩, ⟨1, 0, 0⟩} (= F). (14)
In the case of nonidentical formulas, [𝑃 (𝑥) = 𝑇 𝑟(𝑥) (Telling the Truth)] or [𝑃 (𝑥) =
¬𝑇 𝑟(𝑥) (Liar)], the estimate of the formula 𝑃(𝑥) changes when the estimate for the
free variable 𝑥:
¬S𝑥𝑃(𝑥) = ¬{⟨1, 𝑃 (1), 𝑃 (𝑃 (1))⟩, ⟨0, 𝑃 (0), 𝑃 (𝑃 (0))⟩} (15)
= {⟨¬1, ¬𝑃(1), ¬𝑃(𝑃(1))⟩, ⟨¬0, ¬𝑃(0), ¬𝑃(𝑃(0))⟩} (16)
= {⟨0, 𝑃 (0), 𝑃 (𝑃 (0))⟩, ⟨1, 𝑃 (1), 𝑃 (𝑃 (1))⟩} (17)
= {⟨1, 𝑃 (1), 𝑃 (𝑃 (1))⟩, ⟨0, 𝑃 (0), 𝑃 (𝑃 (0))⟩} = S𝑥𝑃(𝑥) (18)
This is the table for the negation symbol:
S𝑥𝑃(𝑥) ¬S𝑥𝑃(𝑥)
S𝑥(𝑇 𝑟(𝑥) ↔ 𝑇 𝑟(𝑥)) = {⟨1, 1, 1⟩; ⟨0, 1, 1⟩} = T {⟨1, 0, 0⟩, ⟨0, 0, 0⟩} = F (False)
S𝑥(𝑇 𝑟(𝑥)) = {⟨1, 1, 1⟩; ⟨0, 0, 0⟩} = V {⟨1, 1, 1⟩, ⟨0, 0, 0⟩} = V (Void)
S𝑥(¬𝑇 𝑟(𝑥)) = {⟨1, 0, 1⟩; ⟨0, 1, 0⟩} = A {⟨1, 0, 1⟩, ⟨0, 1, 0⟩} = A (Antinomy)
S𝑥(𝑇 𝑟(𝑥) ↔ ¬𝑇 𝑟(𝑥)) = {⟨1, 0, 0⟩; ⟨0, 0, 0⟩} = F {⟨1, 1, 1⟩, ⟨0, 1, 1⟩} = T (Truth)
We define two-place connectives ∘ ∈ {∧, ∨, →, ↔} for two S-formulas S𝑥𝑃(𝑥) and
S𝑥𝑄(𝑥). In this case, we study such a variant of two-place connectives, when the
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trajectories of estimates of the formula 𝑃(𝑥) of the one branch (𝑥 = 1 or 𝑥 = 0)
interact with the trajectories of estimates of the formula 𝑄(𝑥) of the same branch
(𝑥 = 1 or 𝑥 = 0):
⟨1, 𝑃 (1), 𝑃 (𝑃 (1))⟩ ∘ ⟨1, 𝑄(1), 𝑄(𝑄(1))⟩ and ⟨0, 𝑃 (0), 𝑃 (𝑃 (0))⟩ ∘ ⟨0, 𝑄(0), 𝑄(𝑄(0))⟩ ∶
S𝑥𝑃(𝑥) ∘ S𝑥𝑄(𝑥) =
{⟨1, 𝑃 (1), 𝑃 (𝑃 (1))⟩, ⟨0, 𝑃 (0), 𝑃 (𝑃 (0))⟩} ∘ {⟨1, 𝑄(1), 𝑄(𝑄(1))⟩, ⟨0, 𝑄(0), 𝑄(𝑄(0))⟩} =
{⟨1, 𝑃 (1), 𝑃 (𝑃 (1))⟩ ∘ ⟨1, 𝑄(1), 𝑄(𝑄(1))⟩, ⟨0, 𝑃 (0), 𝑃 (𝑃 (0))⟩ ∘ ⟨0, 𝑄(0), 𝑄(𝑄(0))⟩} =
{⟨1 ∘ 1, 𝑃 (1) ∘ 𝑄(1), 𝑃 (𝑃 (1)) ∘ 𝑄(𝑄(1))⟩, ⟨0 ∘ 0, 𝑃 (0) ∘ 𝑄(0), 𝑃 (𝑃 (0)) ∘ 𝑄(𝑄(0))⟩}.
Here are examples of the interactions between the estimates of Liar A and TruthTeller V:
V ∧V = {⟨1, 1, 1⟩, ⟨0, 0, 0⟩} ∧ {⟨1, 1, 1⟩, ⟨0, 0, 0⟩} = {⟨1, 1, 1⟩, ⟨0, 0, 0⟩} = V
A ∧A = {⟨1, 0, 1⟩, ⟨0, 1, 0⟩} ∧ {⟨1, 0, 1⟩, ⟨0, 1, 0⟩} = ⟨1, 0, 1⟩, ⟨0, 1, 0⟩} = A
Let’s reproduce Priest’s tables and compare them with ours, built on our rules:
Hypothesis: 𝑝 = V Priest’s 𝑝 Hypothesis: 𝑝 = A
∧ T V F ∧ 𝑡 𝑝 𝑓 ∧ T A F
T T V F 𝑡 𝑡 𝑝 𝑓 T T A F
V V V F 𝑝 𝑝 𝑝 𝑓 A A A F
F F F F 𝑓 𝑓 𝑓 𝑓 F F F F
∨ T V F ∨ 𝑡 𝑝 𝑓 ∨ T A F
T T T T 𝑡 𝑡 𝑡 𝑡 T T T T
V T V V 𝑝 𝑡 𝑝 𝑝 A T A A
F T V F 𝑓 𝑡 𝑝 𝑓 F T A F
In the same way, we will construct tables for disjunction, implication and reverse
implication, using the latter two and conjunction to construct the equivalence.
Replacing 𝑝 with V (TruthTeller), we state that for 𝑝 = V the truth tables coincide
with the similarly named Priest tables (Priest 1979). Assuming that p corresponds to
A (Liar), we state that the tables on the estimate also coincide with the Priest tables
for 𝑝 = A.
It should be borne in mind that our tables are built on a completely different
principle, different from the principles of Priest’s construction. And this inspires a
certain optimism, when two completely different principles of construction, so to speak,
“external” (priest’s) and “internal” (ours), lead to the same result.
But Priest has no distinction between Liar and TruthTeller, at least in his work
(Priest 1979). Therefore, we will build four-digit tables, where our A and V will act
separately and independently, with their different truth estimates.
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∧ T A V F ∨ T A V F
T T A V F T T T T T
A A A av F A T A va A
V V av V F V T va V V
F F F F F F T A V F
∧ T A V F ∨ T A V F
T T
A av A va
V av V va
F F
Here new assessments from interaction appear A and V: va and av.
A ∧V = {⟨1, 0, 1⟩, ⟨0, 1, 0⟩} ∧ {⟨1, 1, 1⟩, ⟨0, 0, 0⟩} = {⟨1, 0, 1
a1
⟩, ⟨0, 0, 0
v0
⟩} = av (= a1v0)
A ∨V = {⟨1, 0, 1⟩, ⟨0, 1, 0⟩} ∧ {⟨1, 1, 1⟩, ⟨0, 0, 0⟩} = {⟨1, 1, 1
v1
⟩, ⟨0, 1, 0
a0
⟩} = av (= v1a0)
Closed value tables will look like this:
∧ T av A V va F ∨ T av A V va F
T T av A V va F T T T T T T T
av av av av av av F av T av A V va av
A A av A av A F A T A A va va A
V V av av V V F V T V va V va V
va va av A V va F va T va va va va va
F F F F F F F F T av A V va F
∨¬ T av A V va F ¬∨ T av A V va F
T T T T T T T T T av A V va F
av av va V A av T av T va va va va va
A A va va A A T A T V va V va V
V V va V va V T V T A A va va A
va va va va va va T va T av A V va av
F F va V A av T F T T T T T T
↔= ((¬∨) ∧ (∨¬)) = (→ ∧ ←)
↔ T av A V va F ↔ T av A V va F
T T av A V va F T
av av va V A av va av va V A av
A A V va av A V A V va av A
V V A av va V A V A av va V
va va av A V va av va av A V va
F F va V A av T F
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